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The Institutions of Authoritarian Neoliberalism in Malaysia: 
A Critical Review of the Development Agendas Under the 
Regimes of Mahathir, Abdullah, and Najib
Bonn Juego
► Juego, B. (2018). The institutions of authoritarian neoliberalism in Malaysia: A critical review of the 
development agendas under the regimes of Mahathir, Abdullah, and Najib. Austrian Journal of South-East 
Asian Studies, 11(1), 53-79.
After toppling the 61-year dominant Barisan Nasional through a historic election victory in 
May 2018, expectations are high for the new ruling government led by Mahathir Mohamad 
and the Pakatan Harapan to fulfil their promises for socio-economic reforms and regime 
change in Malaysia. But what have been the institutions of the prevailing regime that need 
to be reformed and changed? This article offers a critical review of the evolving devel-
opment agendas since the 1990s of the successive governments of Mahathir Mohamad, 
Abdullah Badawi, and Najib Razak, each couched in different catchphrases: Wawasan 
2020, Islam Hadhari, and 1Malaysia. A close reading of these programs suggests that their 
substance articulates two persistent logics: the ruling elite’s constant requirement for 
political stability enforced by a strong state; and, the need to adapt to the demands and 
opportunities of accumulation in specific phases of Malaysia’s capitalist development in 
the context of globalization. The analysis reveals the attempts at maintaining authoritar-
ian neoliberalism, or a neoliberal economy embedded in an authoritarian polity, as the de 
facto social regime in contemporary Malaysia. By examining policy documents, speeches, 
and news reports, the article discloses how this regime had been enunciated or reified in 
public discourses, policies, and actions of the respective administrations.
Keywords: Abdullah Badawi; Authoritarian Neoliberalism; Mahathir Mohamad; Malaysia; Najib Razak

INTRODUCTION
Malaysia’s 14th general election (GE14) on 9 May 2018 was a historical turning 
point in the country’s politics. It marked the end of the uninterrupted electoral 
dominance of the Barisan Nasional (BN, or the National Front) coalition – partic-
ularly its major party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) – which 
had governed the country since independence from Britain in 1957. It also paved 
the way for Mahathir Mohamad to return to premiership at the age of 92 after 
his first long stint as prime minister in 1981-2003. In a surreal political moment, 
Mahathir emerged as the leader of the opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan 
(PH, or Alliance of Hope) in partnership with his old critics and enemies, notably 
Anwar Ibrahim and Lim Kit Siang. He challenged his former friends and allies 
in the UMNO/BN coalition led by his protégé, then incumbent premier, Najib 
Razak. Eventually, the Mahathir-led opposition pulled off an electoral upset on a 
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campaign platform that promised institutional reforms, anti-corruption, democracy, 
rule of law, and a range of populist economic policies (including the revival of fuel 
subsidies, increase in minimum wage, and the abolition of the controversial goods 
and services tax). Yet, any reform efforts by the new ruling government will have to 
proceed from the existing structures and institutions in Malaysia’s socio-economic 
environment that have been adapted and forged by UMNO/BN in the last 60 years.
The purpose of this article is to take stock of the historical trajectory of Malaysia’s 
contemporary development policies. In doing so, the article reveals a compelling insti-
tutional pattern in the structure of the country’s political economy in which ethnic 
and other social relations are embedded. This is important to understand in the cur-
rent context when the new government under Mahathir enjoys a popular mandate to 
undertake comprehensive reforms. The prevailing institutions in Malaysia’s political 
economy that are unpacked in this article can be considered: firstly, as a structural 
reflection of the ‘initial conditions’ where reform initiatives begin; secondly, as a ‘nor-
mative indicator’ of the specific policies and practices that must be reformed; and 
thirdly, as a ‘benchmark’ against which the processes towards the objective for regime 
change are to be monitored and evaluated. 
Historically, the political-economic attributes of Malaysia have been a mesh of 
a strong state and a relatively open market economy since the colonial period (De 
Micheaux, 2017; Tajuddin, 2012). Politically, Malaysia has had strong features of 
authoritarianism where the general citizenry has been deprived of at least the proce-
dural requirements of fair elections, equal privileges before the law, and a modicum 
of civil liberties and human rights (Case, 1993; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Zakaria, 1989). 
Economically, Malaysia’s open economy is manifested in its pragmatic – rather than 
theoretical – adaptation of trademark neoliberal policies of privatization, liber-
alization and deregulation, as well as in its active production, trade, and financial 
activities in the world market. Even though laissez faire economic policies in Malaysia 
became more prominent since independence, the British state had already set in train 
in colonial Malaya the rudiments of the capitalist institutions that structured the 
unequal relations between classes and ethnicities (Nonini, 2015; Stubbs, 2004). The 
New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971-1991 combined state intervention for the reduc-
tion of inter-ethnic disparity with the empowerment of private sector activity in the 
development process. By the 1980s, intensified privatization and deregulation ini-
tiatives and other structural adjustments through the Malaysia Incorporated Policy 
were undertaken (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). 
This article examines the evolution of Malaysia’s political economy through an 
analysis of the post-NEP development strategies undertaken by successive govern-
ments since the 1990s, namely: Mahathir Mohamad’s Wawasan 2020, Abdullah 
Badawi’s Islam Hadhari, and Najib Razak’s 1Malaysia. The analysis is done through an 
inductive approach derived from examining, as well as making extensive references 
to official policy documents, the speeches of the prime ministers, and news reports. 
The article suggests that the changing slogans from administration to administra-
tion are essentially articulations of two persistent and interdependent logics. The 
first logic is the incessant need of the ruling elites for a strong state to safeguard 
social and political stability. The second logic is the consistent stance of the elites 
in government to adapt to the evolving accumulation demands and opportunities 
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at particular periods in Malaysia’s capitalist development. This is manifested by the 
series of adjustments in the country’s development plans in accordance with the shift 
in neoliberalism’s policy emphasis. In general, neoliberal development strategies 
have shifted from the so-called Washington Consensus during the 1980s-1990s to 
the Post-Washington Consensus by the mid-1990s. The Washington Consensus had 
a rather limited focus on open market economy through macro-economic programs of 
privatization and liberalization. The Post-Washington Consensus has a broader and 
more comprehensive set of policies focused on competitive capitalism through deep-
seated institutional reforms and behavioral changes – lodged in the agendas on good 
governance, competition cultures, labor market flexibility, human capital, and social 
capital (Cammack, 2006; Fine, 2001a, 2001b). Against the background of globaliza-
tion, Malaysia’s national development policies have been adapted to specific phases of 
neoliberalism and the changes in the geopolitical economy, in particular: 
1. Mahathir-style neoliberalization-with-industrialization during the 
1980s-1990s, in between the paradigm shift from a declining Keynesian 
developmentalism and an emergent Washington Consensus; 
2. Abdullah’s agenda for a ‘moderate’ Islamic capitalism in the aftermaths of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 9/11 terror attacks; and
3. Najib’s strategy for competitiveness as a response to the 2008-2009 global 
economic recession, the decline of oil prices in the world market in 2014, 
and the new scramble for capital from the rise of China.
The article’s analysis reveals the apparent attempts of the governing elites at 
maintaining a peculiar form of regime which can be referred to as authoritarian neo-
liberalism – that is, a neoliberal economy embedded in an authoritarian polity. As the 
de facto social regime in Malaysia, the aims and strategies of authoritarian neolib-
eralism across the tenures of Mahathir, Abdullah, and Najib had remained roughly 
consistent: (1) operating a strong state; (2) managing social conflicts; and (3) perpetu-
ating a type of neoliberalism that expands the economy in a changing global context 
while enriching entrenched local elites.
By charting the discursive mutations of Malaysia’s authoritarian neoliberalism, 
the article puts forward an interpretation which has implications for a number of 
important contributions from regime studies and transitions literature. In regime 
studies, the debate whether to categorize Malaysia as a ‘developmental state’ depends 
on how this concept is defined (Stubbs, 2009). Some analysts have classified Malaysia 
as a developmental state (Embong, 2008; Jomo, 1997, 2001) or a semi-developmental 
state (Rhodes & Higgott, 2000) mainly due to its state intervention in the econ-
omy through conscious policy planning of the nation’s industrialization strategies. 
However, Malaysia’s long history of corruption and wasteful rent-seeking activities 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Jomo & Gomez, 2000) are indications that it has not embodied 
the key institutions and mechanisms that are noted in more developed Asian capi-
talist developmental states/cities of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. Specifically, each of these developed economies has a Weberian ‘rational’ 
bureaucracy, which is autonomous from particular vested interests, and which has 
a strong sense of corporate coherence built around a concrete set of social ties that 
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have been forged through negotiations of collective goals (Evans, 1995; Gomez, 2009; 
Johnson, 1987, 1999). 
The end of UMNO’s hegemony and the recent electoral success of longtime 
opposition groups from the Reformasi movement that formed the PH coalition have 
significant implications for transitions literature on Malaysia’s ‘democratization 
processes’, particularly those studies on protest actions and other forms of contesta-
tions (Loh & Khoo, 2002; Shamsul, 2002; Weiss, 2006). Thus far, the literature on 
Malaysian politics has offered valid accounts and arguments about both the country’s 
democratization processes and its resilient authoritarianism. The outcome of GE14 
calls for a note of caution against tendencies in political analysis to either underesti-
mate democratization or overestimate authoritarianism. In light of this, the analytical 
focus of the article is on the project of the then-dominant UMNO/BN elites to con-
solidate Malaysia’s neoliberal capitalism within an authoritarian political framework. 
Knowledge of this has empirical and normative ramifications for current and future 
reform processes in Malaysia under the new government of Mahathir and the PH.
MAHATHIR’S WAWASAN 2020
The first tenure of Mahathir as prime minister (1981-2003) was associated with 
his development program called Wawasan 2020, or Vision 2020. Within the frame-
work of the National Development Policy (NDP) of 1991, and complemented by the 
Malaysia Boleh! (Malaysia Can!) campaign, Wawasan 2020 was packaged with a popu-
list message to revitalize the growth and redistributive objectives of the NEP. The 
NDP’s 30-year plan proclaimed the vision for social justice, political democracy, and 
competitive capitalism (Malaysia, 1991a). However, the legacy of Mahathir’s 22-year 
regime exhibited a distinct mix of authoritarianism, crony capitalism, and neoliberal-
ism (Gomez, 2009; Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Khoo, 1995). 
The Fifth Malaysia Plan 1985-1990 (5MP) was a precursor to Wawasan 2020. It 
embodied Mahathir’s restructuring policies for both the government and the economy. 
These programs were expressed in the concepts: Looking East, Malaysia Incorporated, 
Privatization, and Leadership by example. The 5MP was the first development plan 
drafted under Mahathir to implement the last phase of NEP. Arguably, it was also the 
first articulation of the Mahathir regime’s authoritarian neoliberalism. Its objective 
was to further Malaysia’s entanglement with global capitalist processes, consistent 
with neoliberalism’s private sector-led growth strategy. Moreover, the 5MP made a 
policy shift from ‘growth with equity’ to ‘growth with stability’ aimed at securing 
market mechanisms through disciplinary state power. Amid threats to his leader-
ship in the run-up to the 1987 party elections and the worsening recession, Mahathir 
resorted to authoritarian responses in both the political and economic spheres: 
through the Internal Security Act (ISA) to stifle his critics even those within UMNO; 
and through the imposition of the premier’s power over the bureaucracy under the 
guise of government streamlining for market reforms (Khoo, 1992; Khoo, 1995; Milne 
& Mauzy, 1999; Munro-Kua, 1996). Having won this election, Mahathir carried on 
with the same peculiar methods of patronage politics, authoritarianism, and eco-
nomic restructuring. Powerful executive institutions continued to encroach on the 
bureaucracy and the economy. 
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Wawasan 2020 was introduced at the end of the Cold War and signaled Mahathir’s 
embrace of neoliberal globalization. It served as a “state-class ideology” in which 
cross-ethnic alliances were based on a particular class interest (Hilley, 2001). But 
since repression had limitations as a political strategy, Mahathir opted for consensus-
building to consolidate a power bloc around Vision 2020 (Hilley, 2001; Munro-Kua, 
1996). As John Hilley (2001) has aptly described, the UMNO/BN under Mahathir’s 
leadership was able to forge a hegemonic network that “[extended] outwards and 
beyond conventional party arrangements, with chains of influence ranging from cor-
porate elites to the BN media, from party affiliates to Islamic fora, voluntary bodies 
and a panoply of NGOs” (pp. 117-118). At the heart of the regime’s politics of con-
sociationalism was the practice of a fluid, interactive, and accommodating art of 
“hegemonic networking”, which tried to balance the protection of “particular sectoral 
interests” with their “shared outlook on the maintenance of the broader power struc-
ture” (Hilley, 2001, p. 118). This network was constantly engaged in the reproduction 
of “dominant ideas and interests through diverse processes of political, corporate and 
ideological exchange” and was receptive to “the incorporation of new interest groups 
and alliances” (Hilley, 2001, p. 118).
Economic Heterodoxy
Unlike other developing countries such as the Philippines and parts of Latin America 
which embarked on neoliberalism without specialization in the manufacturing 
industry, the kind of neoliberalization in Malaysia was pursued with a national indus-
trialization strategy oriented towards exports to the world market (Juego, 2013, 2015). 
Yet, this neoliberal industrialization project for the economy was anchored to the 
politics of authoritarianism and the discourse of nationalism. Authoritarianism was 
conducive to the industrialization project not as part of the official development plan, 
but as a proactive realization of the governing elites on the advantages of repressive 
state measures for their stability (Crouch, 1994). The “Mahathirist programme” pur-
sued a blend of capitalism and nationalism for socio-economic development – that is, 
“a nationalist project driven by capitalist impulses or a capitalist project imbued with 
nationalist aspirations” (Khoo, 2003a, p. 5). The anchoring of the economic project 
for neoliberal industrialization to the politics of authoritarianism and nationalism 
served a three-pronged purpose for the regime, notably: (1) to expand profitable 
opportunities for the local capitalist class in a diversified manufacturing sector, (2) 
while meeting the security requirements of the ruling elites in business and govern-
ment, and likewise (3) gaining a substantial degree of social legitimacy.
It is suggested here that Mahathir adopted a ‘heterodox’ economic policy which 
was different from the orthodox prospectus of neoliberalism under the Washington 
Consensus. This is revealed through a scrutiny of the political imperatives behind 
the regime’s economic reform initiatives in the policies of liberalization, austerity, 
deregulation, and privatization. 
First, Mahathir had a calibrated perspective on trade and industrial policies. On 
the one hand, he appreciated the benefits of gradual liberalization; on the other, he 
understood the necessity of protectionism in the industrialization process. In his 
own words: 
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We should take into the fullest consideration Malaysia’s capacity to undertake 
liberalization. We should not dismiss the infant industry argument, but we 
should not bow to illegitimate pressure. (Mahathir, 1991)
He argued that “it is important for [Malaysia] that free trade is maintained” due 
to its very small domestic market; at the same time, he claimed to adhere to a prin-
ciple in international relations where “the emphasis should be less on politics and 
ideology but more on economic imperatives” (Mahathir, 1991). In a blog post entitled 
“Protectionism”, then-private citizen Mahathir (2011) decried G20’s double standard 
and noted that while Malaysia believes in competition it is important to have protec-
tion in its domestic economy because it is “up against countries which protect their 
industries against foreign products”.  
Secondly, Mahathir’s agenda on austerity had both economic and political ratio-
nales. Managing inflation was intended for stabilization of the economy and the 
regime. The bottom line of belt-tightening measures was that the citizenry had to 
bear the brunt of an economy undergoing the process of neoliberalization, absorb the 
consequences of market failures, and be subjected to disciplinary whipping from the 
state. Mahathir (1991) minced no words:
The public must understand what causes inflation and must be disciplined 
enough to combat it. In some countries when inflation rates go up to thousands 
of per cent per year, Governments have been changed again and again without 
inflation being contained. The reason is that the people are not disciplined and 
prepared to restrain themselves. No Government can put a stop to inflation un-
less the people are prepared to accept the discomfort of austerity.
Thirdly, Wawasan 2020 adopted the policy of deregulation while insisting on the 
need for regulation. Its logic equated the economic policy of regulation with the poli-
tics of ‘order’. Mahathir (1991) argued:
The process of deregulation will continue. There can be no doubt that regula-
tions are an essential part of the governance of society, of which the economy 
is a part. A state without laws and regulations is a state flirting with anarchy. 
Without order, there can be little business and no development. What is not 
required is over regulation although it may not be easy to decide when the 
Government is over regulating.
Here, it is implied that the source of strength of the market order and elite hegemony 
had to be state regulation and repression. This dynamic interdependence for survival 
between the market, elites, and state became more pronounced in times of crises. The 
observations have been that Mahathir’s government acted even more authoritarian 
over both the public and the economic spheres during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and 
its aftermath than during periods of relative stability (Pant, 2002; Pepinsky, 2009). To a 
large extent, the 9/11 event also provided the government the legitimacy to implement 
repressive laws, to suppress public protests, and to pass new electoral laws conducive 
to gerrymandering – all of which were hostile to the opposition. 
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Lastly, the Malaysian privatization experience had been an inherently political 
process. The Mahathir administration’s privatization program was shaped by the 
intractable political economy of rent-seeking in the regime’s state-class relations. 
Implementation of the Privatization Master Plan (PMP) in the 1990s was plagued with 
the same failures as in the early privatization projects in the 1980s. The PMP failed 
to meet its foremost objective to restructure ownership of public assets to encour-
age competitive private sector activity. Instead, the privatization of public wealth, 
assets, and services had enlarged UMNO’s patron-client network, encouraged the 
proliferation of rentier activities, escalated corruption, politicized business, and insti-
tutionalized money politics (Gomez, 1997; Jomo, 1995; Tan, 2008). In terms of policy 
implementation, notable reasons for failures were the absence of transparency in the 
selection process, weak regulation, and the lack of complete divestiture. A compre-
hensive study by Jeff Tan (2008) shows the ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ failures of the state 
in the major privatization projects from 1983 to 2000.1 Ex ante failures were flaws 
in project planning, including wrong choice of industries and bidders, regulatory 
capture, and contract provisions disadvantageous to the state. Ex post failures were 
deficiencies in the government’s capacity in project management, including issues on 
resolute state regulation for the general public. 
The privatization experience under the Mahathir regime suggests that political-
business elites, as well as domestic and foreign capital, dominated the conflict-ridden 
scramble for rents. It also tells that the process entailed both state and market fail-
ures. Yet, the drive for private appropriation tried to avoid any public responsibility 
and resulted in the deprivation of the general population of their collective resources.
But how did the Mahathir regime’s ethnic cronyism and state-orchestrated redis-
tribution policy relate to its adoption of neoliberal policies based on pro-market 
ideology? This seemingly contradictory nature of the political economy of authori-
tarian neoliberalism was likewise one of its most compelling features for the ruling 
elites. The state had sanctioned accumulation activities of its cronies in an enlarging 
market space opened up by selective privatization and liberalization policies (Gomez, 
2009). In the process of neoliberalization, the state had allowed entrenched cronies 
to exploit bigger market spaces and use broader market means, purportedly to attain 
the developmental goals of an ethnically defined and biased redistribution policy. 
For instance, in the bidding of projects associated with policies of liberalization and 
privatization, business cronies had first-mover advantages in the competition due to 
their political connections and access to state decision-makers (Juego, 2013, 2015). 
Apparently, such scheme did not necessarily result in regime stability, but rather it 
had been ridden with corruption, ethnicized divisions, and social conflicts.
Mahathir’s perspective on economic development may be a strange mix of nation-
alism, protectionism, and neoliberalism; but it was by all means capitalist and elitist. 
The NDP was forthright in its call on the citizens to accept the fundamental nature of 
unequal social relations. It posited that inequality between human beings and uneven 
development across spaces are intuitive and normal. The Second Outline Perspective 
Plan, 1991-2000 affirmed that “uneven development is characteristic of most market 
1 The case studies in Jeff Tan’s (2008) book covered the four largest privatization projects, namely, Indah 
Water Konsortium (the operator of the national sewerage system), Kuala Lumpur’s Light Rail Transit, 
Malaysia Airlines (the national airline), and Proton (the national car company). 
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economies” (Malaysia, 1991a). Mahathir (1991) also clarified that, under Wawasan 
2020, the principle of “individual income equality” does not mean that “all Malaysians 
will have the same income”. His argument was premised on an individualistic ontol-
ogy, contending that “by sheer dint of our own individual effort, our own individual 
upbringing and our individual preferences, we all have different economic worth, and 
will be financially rewarded differently” (Mahathir, 1991). He then went on to assert 
that “an equality of individual income as propounded by socialists and communists is 
not only not possible, it is not desirable and is a formula for disaster” (Mahathir, 1991).
Anti-Democracy
Even though Mahathir spoke of Malaysia’s variant of ‘democracy’ in some occasions, 
he believed that the political regime of authoritarianism was the most conducive 
to Wawasan 2020 to flourish. In his classic The Malay Dilemma (1970), Mahathir’s 
ethnicity-based analysis of backwardness and prescription of cultural conditioning 
for attaining modernization defeats the principle of liberal freedoms. In “The New 
Malay Dilemma”, which was one of his last speeches before he resigned as prime min-
ister, Mahathir (2002) discussed the two new dilemmas of the ethnic Malays and the 
society of Malaysia, namely, affirmative action and democratization. As regards the 
first of the new dilemma, Mahathir (2002) asked whether Malays “should or should 
not do away with the crutches [i.e., affirmative action] that they have gotten used to, 
which in fact they have become proud of”. The second new dilemma that Mahathir 
(2002) identified was framed in the question: “Can we take a leaf from their [i.e., most 
liberal democracies] book and risk condemnation for not being democratic?”. He 
asserted that “Malaysia is committed to democracy”, which he conceptually reduced 
to its “most important element” – that is, the mere conduct of elections, or the act 
of ensuring the voters’ “right to elect” for the party they want to represent them in 
government. As one of the staunchest proponents of Asian Values, specifically the 
idea to prioritize economic development over political democracy, Mahathir’s (2002) 
polemics was straightforward and warned against democratization in the context of 
a developing Malaysian economy: “The dilemma that the Malays and the peoples of 
Malaysia face is whether we should in the name of democracy allow the country to be 
destroyed, or we ensure that people are not subjected to manipulations to the point 
where they will use democracy to destroy democracy”.
Furthermore, during the Mahathir regime, harassment of the opposition and 
social movements was accompanied by legislative regulations and repressive practices 
to discipline the media (Munro-Kua, 1996; Tapsell, 2013). In 1999, the Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2000) included Mahathir in the list of “Ten Worst Enemies 
of the Press” and described him as “a master puppeteer, … [pulling] the strings of the 
major media, mostly owned or controlled by his ruling coalition, to perpetuate his 
power”. Mahathir (2002) also censured the nurturing of politically conscious (Malay) 
students who “don’t seem to appreciate the opportunities they got” but instead 
“become more interested in other things, politics in particular, to the detriment of 
their studies”. This implies that the banner of Wawasan 2020’s goal of attaining a 
fully developed economy with ‘productive’ workforce had to co-exist with a strategy 
for the de-politicization of the youth and students. All these authoritarian means 
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signified the bold assertion of Mahathir and his UMNO/BN allies to protect their 
monopoly not only on politics and public discourse but also on the wealth of material 
resources that come with the control of state power and social institutions.
Mahathir officially left the premier’s office after 22 years in power. Yet, Wawasan 
2020 has remained, in principle, the development vision of Malaysia. Succeeding 
governments of Abdullah and Najib had expressed their commitments to it. Having 
been functionaries themselves during Mahathir’s regime, Abdullah and Najib were 
conscious of the deepened and widened system of patronage in Malaysia’s power rela-
tions. True to form, they had consistently envisioned a society governed within the 
general framework of a capitalist economy resting upon elite interests and guarded 
by an authoritarian state. 
ABDULLAH’S ISLAM HADHARI 
Upon taking over the government from Mahathir and having been part of the 
hegemonic network that forged and promoted Wawasan 2020, Abdullah Badawi 
(2003-2009) declared that “My vision for Malaysia is Vision 2020” (Wain, 2009, p. 307; 
see also Abdullah, 2006a, 2006b). In line with this affirmation, and hence the resolve 
to pursue the NEP and NDP objectives, in 2004 Abdullah’s government introduced 
the concept of Islam Hadhari (Civilizational Islam) as “a comprehensive and univer-
sal development framework for the nation” that balances “between physical and 
spiritual development” – meaning, the “imperative for the people” to have economic 
“progress” and civilizational “advancement” that is “firmly rooted in the universal val-
ues and injunctions of Islam” (Malaysia, 2005, p. 9). Even though “the tenets of Islam” 
would be the basis of the development framework, its proponents claimed that it 
should benefit all people regardless of religion, race, and other identities in the multi-
ethnic society of Malaysia. In theory and practice, Islam Hadhari was made to ground 
in the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism. 
With hindsight, the discursive appeal of linking Islam Hadhari to Wawasan 2020 
served some important political, electoral, and economic objectives for Abdullah, 
the UMNO/BN coalition, and Malaysia’s neoliberalism. Firstly, it attempted to sus-
tain support of the elites and masses across classes and ethnicities who continued 
to believe in Mahathir’s leadership and the modernization project. Secondly, it had 
enlarged UMNO/BN bailiwick coming from moderate Muslim constituencies. And 
thirdly, especially in a post-9/11 moment, it was designed to attract foreign capital 
and investments from both the Muslim world and ‘Western’ economies. Mahathir 
later turned out to be the most vehement critic of Abdullah’s leadership, and he 
denounced Islam Hadhari, which he argued to be as a misnomer since Islam itself as 
well as being a Muslim is compatible with living a balanced life and with the belief in 
progress. But the nub of the conflict between Mahathir and Abdullah was more due 
to political and personal reasons than based on ideological differences (Wain, 2009). 
Both of them adhered to the idea of capitalist market-oriented development and to 
a critique of democracy.
The impressive victory of the BN coalition in the 2004 general elections, winning 
an overwhelming majority of votes and securing 199 of 219 parliament seats, was often 
credited to Abdullah’s charisma, his well-received attempts at ‘de-Mahathirization’ or 
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not living in the shadow of Mahathir, and the drawing power of the Islam Hadhari 
slogan (Chong, 2006; Khoo, 2003b). However, beyond personality-based analysis of 
election success, the fact was that Abdullah and UMNO were the greatest electoral 
beneficiaries of the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism that Mahathir and his 
power clique had long instituted. Decades of UMNO dominance of money politics 
made possible the consolidation of a wealthy and powerful electoral machinery, the 
control of mainstream media, and the crippling of dissenters (Loh, 2005). The mod-
ernization project of the Mahathir regime’s power bloc also built the foundations for: 
the promotion of the image of a moderate Islam especially after 9/11; the normaliza-
tion of the perception of the conduciveness of neoliberal policies to economic growth 
and long-term social development; and the popularization of the Asian Values dis-
course that conceptually separates or detaches development from democratization.
Capitalism With Islamic Characteristics
With a fresh mandate from party mates and the electorate, Abdullah launched the 
National Mission in 2005, the midpoint between the introduction and termination 
of Vision 2020. As a policy framework for a 15-year period, the National Mission rec-
ognized that while “Malaysia is now an open trading economy participating in an 
extremely competitive and fast-moving global marketplace”, there persist “consider-
able income and wealth inequalities”, uneven rural-urban development, and “racial 
polarization” (Malaysia, 2005, pp. 3-4). It expressed the usual development rhetoric 
of the previous regime: “a resilient and competitive economy” based on the goals 
of “equity” and inclusive growth (Malaysia, 2005, p. 4). Guided by the principle of 
Islam Hadhari, the National Mission wanted to avoid the “danger of … possessing 
first-class infrastructure but third-class mentality” by fortifying “moral and ethical 
foundations” and changing “mindset and attitudes” to be able to compete globally 
“through meaningful participation … in the competitive and productive growth 
process” (Malaysia, 2005, p. 4). To this end, the Abdullah administration expanded 
free-trade agreements with the US, India, Chile, Pakistan, and the Asia Pacific region 
including Australia and New Zealand to complement Mahathir’s earlier negotiations 
with Japan and China (Wain, 2009).
The Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) detailed the strategies and budgetary allocations 
to realize the National Mission. Its program for continued macroeconomic reforms 
were buttressed by a new discursive thrust at the turn of the 21st century (Abdullah, 
2006a; Malaysia, 2005). The discourse of ‘ownership’ was emphasized to instill a 
sense of responsibility among stakeholders from the private and public sectors to 
civil society in the accumulation regime. The objective of ‘human capital develop-
ment’ aimed at capability building and skills upgrading, as well as the conditioning of 
values and mentalities of the population attuned to the capitalist ethos. The idea of 
‘transborder development’ meant restructuring the geography of capital accumula-
tion where competing centers are clustered as productive corridors for the market.
In sum, the National Mission’s agenda was indicative of the twofold feature in 
Malaysia’s envisioned modernization process. The first was the country’s struggle 
with the intractable problems of economic poverty, social inequalities, and politi-
cal-cultural conflicts. The second was the country’s alignment with the evolving 
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discourse in global development whereby neoliberalism has moved away from a 
narrow concern on macro-economic adjustments to a broader project for competi-
tiveness through institutional and human behavioral change. 
Overall, Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari project was illustrative of the contradictions 
of the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism in conceptual, pragmatic, and empirical 
terms. Despite the principle’s ambiguity, its particularly capitalist, racist, and non-
democratic orientations were revealing of the class, ethnic, and political interests 
behind the ideology. 
Conceptually, Islam Hadhari defines a vision of creating a civilization of Malaysian 
capitalism with Islamic characteristics. There are ideological or religious debates 
about the compatibility of Islam with capitalism, or Islamic economics with mod-
ern capitalism, and the extent to which capitalist penetration impacts on the rise 
and decline of civilizations. However, the history of both the Islamic civilization 
and global capitalism has shown how the encroachment of capital on cultures and 
religions, particularly through imperialist wars, can appropriate surplus from them 
and can become an influential force in their evolution (Atasoy, 2009; Bayat, 1992; 
Kadri, 2016; Karim, 2011; Rodinson, 1973). Theoretically and historically, capitalism 
and Islam can accommodate each other but in ways that necessarily induce ideologi-
cal contestations and social conflicts. What the Islam Hadhari experiment desired to 
prove was the case that Islam could flourish on a capitalist system. 
Abdullah’s (2006a) program in “building a civilization to elevate the nation’s dig-
nity” was aimed at unleashing the capitalist spirit from Muslim and non-Muslim 
citizens of Malaysia. This was evident in the objectives and strategies delineated 
in the National Mission and the 9MP, where Islamic values would be a thin icing 
on a largely neoliberal capitalist cake. The crux of the logic of changing behaviors 
and mindsets – that is, towards a ‘first-class mentality’ – is for culture to adapt to 
and facilitate the requirements of economic productivity and competitiveness. In 
essence, the development approach of Islam Hadhari was to strengthen the material-
ity of capitalism within which the ideology of Islam is to be imbued.
Failed Political Reforms
Pragmatically, Islam Hadhari had served as an ideological façade of the interests of 
ethnic Islam and UMNO. This became more pronounced in an issue in early 2006, 
when nine non-Malay ministers submitted a memorandum to Abdullah calling for 
a review of laws affecting rights of non-Muslims (Chow & Loh, 2006). UMNO took 
offense of this initiative, which was eventually withdrawn through the usual politics 
of consociation, notwithstanding its legitimacy. 
Further, the executive and the parliament had systematically ignored the advo-
cacy and work of the civil society and SUHAKAM (the Human Rights Commission 
of Malaysia) that proposed reforms and investigations on human rights cases, which 
also implicated some UMNO officers (Rodan, 2009). While Abdullah appointed a 
Royal Commission for Police Reform, his administration did not act upon its report 
on issues such as police payoffs and extrajudicial killings, as well as their recommen-
dations which included the establishment of the Independent Police Complaints 
and Misconduct Commission and a possible repeal of the ISA (Tikamdas, 2005). This 
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inaction was telling of the regime’s unwillingness to restructure the coercive appara-
tuses of the state according to human rights principles. 
Empirically, the attempts at governance reforms under the rubric of the Islam 
Hadhari principle were not only thwarted by the established structures of patronage, 
impunity, and corruption, Abdullah himself was also accused of nepotism and crony-
ism. Despite gaining a very popular mandate and a generally positive international 
media perception as Malaysia started off a post-Mahathir era, Abdullah’s anti-
corruption campaign and anti-cronyism promises to ensure some sense of integrity 
in government contracts for a supposedly liberal economy soon faltered. The inves-
tigative journalist Barry Wain (2009) observed that: “While Abdullah deserved the 
sobriquet Mr. Clean in the sense that he had not enriched himself, his family and 
friends had benefited from the system of patronage he was supposed to be disman-
tling” (p. 312). In his book Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times, 
Wain (2009) also revealed features of authoritarian neoliberalism under the Abdullah 
government. These were evident in a number of the Abdullah administration’s paro-
chial decisions and anti-democratic actions that specifically privileged family- and 
crony-based interests of executive dominance over the competitiveness ideology of 
a neoliberal economy. Firstly, one of the most controversial issues was the reported 
favors granted to Abdullah’s brother in the catering business servicing the armed 
forces and the national airlines (Wain, 2009).2 Secondly, media remained in the hands 
of the political and business cronies of UMNO leaders as Abdullah loyalists and 
trusted allies were appointed to key media posts, including the management of TV3 
and the national news agency Bernama (Brown, 2005; Wain, 2009). Thirdly, there 
was growing perception from local and international human rights organizations 
that the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) – supposedly Abdullah’s 
reform legacy – turned out to be an instrument of the incumbent government to 
selectively prosecute the political opposition.3 Lastly, institutions for the strengthen-
ing of democratization, especially the Election Commission to guarantee free, fair, 
and credible elections and the MACC (the restructured Anti-Corruption Agency) to 
ensure government integrity and end the culture of impunity, were within the Prime 
Minister’s Department itself. 
If there was any strong indication of the general shortcomings of the Islam 
Hadhari project, it had to be the dismal electoral performance of the Abdullah-led 
BN in the 2008 general elections that caused the ruling coalition the loss of the key 
states of Selangor, Penang, Kelantan, and Kedah to the political opposition Pakatan 
Rakyat. While there might be several contributing factors to the project’s failure, it 
is instructive to point out three important explanations. The first was the apparent 
disappointment of the electorate on the inability of Abdullah to deliver on his reform 
promises. The second was the fragile discursive construction of the Islam Hadhari 
concept that was framed along conflict-inducing religious and ethnic undercurrents 
– which was unlike Mahathir’s Wawasan 2020 that used a ‘more inclusive’ language 
2 The corruption allegations implicating Abdullah and family were issues related to: a 15-year contract 
for canteens in the armed forces when Abdullah was defense minister, and the awarding of a nine-year 
guaranteed return with the privatization of the catering service of the national airlines (see Wain, 2009).
3 This was amplified as a result of the suspicious death of Teoh Beng Hock from the then opposition 
Democratic Action Party while under custody of MACC for corruption allegations.
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for a multiethnic society and was built on a more solid hegemonic network. The third 
was the precariousness of the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism whose hegemony 
had been challenged by different social forces with respective visions for alterna-
tive futures. In particular, this signified that a counter-hegemonic movement of the 
opposition had arisen to contest the hegemony of UMNO. In 2009, even though BN 
still had a slim parliamentary majority, Abdullah resigned and officially handed on 
the government leadership to his deputy. 
NAJIB’S 1MALAYSIA
Najib Razak (2009-2018) took over the premiership from Abdullah with: the party 
mandate to regain UMNO’s dominance; the ethnic Islam and Malay interest to keep 
their socio-economic privileges; the capitalist development objective to overcome 
the impact of the 2008 global recession; and a personal ambition to craft his own 
legacy. As a strategic step to address these aims and demands, Najib (2009a) launched 
the program 1Malaysia, or “1Malaysia: People First, Performance Now”, as a key pillar 
of his administration’s agenda for national transformation. The articulation and 
execution of 1Malaysia evoked the earlier observed modus operandi of authoritarian 
neoliberalism – that is, attuned to the incumbent government’s interests in the main-
tenance of the status quo and to the exigencies of the global and domestic economies. 
It was presented as a perpetuation of UMNO’s historical hegemony. As Najib (2009b) 
asserted: 
1Malaysia does not reject our past in order to secure our future. Rather it is a 
clear reaffirmation of the ‘documents of destiny’ that have shaped this great na-
tion and bound it together since our Independence – the Federal Constitution, 
the Rukun Negara, the guiding principles of the NEP, Wawasan 2020 and the 
National Mission.
Spanning nine years and two terms, the Najib administration’s economic vision 
for competitiveness was carried out through policies for further liberalization, priva-
tization, fiscal discipline, and market reforms. These were formulated in the context 
of the effects on the domestic economy of the 2008 global economic crisis, the 2014 
oil crash, and the re-emergence of China as an economic superpower. At the same 
time, repression of civil and political rights persisted (Case, 2017). In essence, Najib’s 
1Malaysia would be best understood as: an electoral campaign and political agenda; a 
socio-economic development strategy; and a crisis response.
Political Doublespeak on Democracy
As an electoral campaign and political agenda, the 1Malaysia slogan made a populist 
appeal while the regime continued on repressive measures against dissenters. On the 
one hand, it promoted the discourses of national unity, socio-economic reforms, and 
political democracy to muster a broad inter-ethnic support. On the other hand, the 
discourse was buttressed by the government’s harassment of critics and opposition. 
Examine, for example, the contradictions in Najib’s pronouncements about democracy 
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under existing power relations and the announcement about the repeal of the draco-
nian ISA. In a speech where he outlined his administration’s media relations policy, 
Najib (2009c) spoke of the “need to renew [Malaysia’s] democracy” by establishing a 
“new national discourse on the principles of transparency and accountability; service 
to all, not just the few; and respect and fairness in the public dialogue”. He then pro-
claimed a version of democracy based on the principles of consensus, social equality, 
and interactivity that can be qualified as ‘radical’ given the historically institutional-
ized stratification in the society: “a constructive civilized consensus – across all people, 
races, parties and media – that engages the Nation in the political process” (Najib, 
2009c). Yet, even at the discursive level, the 1Malaysia concept’s allusion to a certain 
kind of ‘inclusive’ politics was contested not only by sections of the Chinese and Indian 
communities, but also by some factions within the UMNO social bloc and their grass-
roots constituencies. The latter groups strongly believed in preserving the privileges of 
Malays and Islam in government policies and social institutions. Indeed, Najib’s rhet-
oric on ‘democratic’ governance was faced with disparate communal interests from 
ethno-religious groups and with the often competing political-business interests with-
in the UMNO network. In its strategy to keep the opposition at bay, the Najib regime 
had also denied civil liberties through violent dispersal of peaceful protests such as the 
Bersih 2.0 demonstrations for electoral reforms, arrests of opposition politicians, and 
the clamp down on free press including threats to imprison critical bloggers. All of 
these were done in the name of unity, order, and stability under the 1Malaysia banner.
On 15 September 2011, the eve of Malaysia Day, Najib announced the abolition 
of the ISA whose detention-without-trial provision had been a serious human rights 
concern since 1960 (Munro-Kua, 1996). A careful examination of his speech for this 
occasion would reveal his political doublespeak on democratization where he made 
a distinction between the aspirations of the people for democracy and the impera-
tive of the state for social order. Speaking with a Lincolnian rhetoric, Najib (2011) 
claimed to have been “feeling the pulse, agitation and aspiration of the [people] … 
for a more open and dynamic democracy, where the opinions, ideas and concerns 
of the masses are given due attention”. He then emphasized his aim for Malaysia 
“to be at par with other democratic systems in the world which are underscored by 
the universal principle from the people, by the people and for the people”. However, 
this rhetorical aspiration for democracy had to be sidelined by the post-9/11 secu-
rity concerns and subsumed under the doctrine of the protection of authority as the 
raison d’état. Najib (2011) justified the legitimacy of the authoritarian disposition by 
arguing it is a “global truth” because the objective of national security “unavoidably 
… demands special measures [such as preventive detention] which sometimes are 
outside the democratic norms”. He substantiated this argument with “Islamic law” 
by highlighting the principle of Usul Fiqah on “the need to prevent a wrongdoing 
from occurring” and the belief “that the decision of the ruler is a trust which must be 
implemented for the people being governed for their general benefit” (Najib, 2011). 
Then he framed tough state security enforcement as a normal empirical reality that is 
“not something strange, unusual or alien” because in the 9/11 aftermath “it has been 
proven that developed democratic countries such as the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom had also enacted special legislative framework to deal with 
terrorist threats” (Najib, 2011).
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After the ISA was formally repealed in 2011, SOSMA (the Security Offences Special 
Measures Act of 2012) was enacted (Malaysia, 2012). SOSMA has been complemented 
by the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2015 and the National Security Council Act 
of 2016 (Malaysia, 2015a, 2016). Akin to the ISA, these expanded national security 
laws are not aligned with international human rights standards. They continue to 
give special powers in terms of legal rules and discretionary authority to the prime 
minister and the whole state apparatus, especially the police and public prosecutors 
over issues of preventive detention without judicial review, arbitrary arrests, surveil-
lance, and access to sensitive information. 
Global Competitiveness, Large-Scale Corruption, and Megaprojects
As a socio-economic development strategy, 1Malaysia was designed for the continu-
ity of neoliberalization. Its immediate economic agenda was to overcome the global 
recession which posed difficulties on the Malaysian economy, especially the slow-
down of the exports industry. The 1Malaysia program was the first of the “Four Pillars 
of National Transformation” of the Najib administration which enjoined the govern-
ment to act as a “competitive corporation” with market-friendly policies in pursuit 
of global competitiveness (Najib, 2010a, 2010b). It was envisioned to work with the 
other pillars: Government Transformation Programme (GTP), Economic Transformation 
Programme (ETP), and the Tenth Malaysia Plan (10MP).
Central to GTP are good governance (to fight corruption) and social order (to 
reduce crimes) with a view to making state institutions responsive to the require-
ments of local and foreign capital for security and calculability. As Najib (2008) 
remarked at the Malaysian Capital Market Summit: “Stability, predictability and cer-
tainty … have been the corner-stones of our economic development, prosperity and 
progress as a nation. We have built prosperity for Malaysia and Malaysians because 
we have a Government which is stable, united, liberal and pro-business.”
The highlight of the ETP was the New Economic Model (NEM), which charted the 
strategies to escape the “middle-income trap” by upgrading productivity and enhancing 
national competitiveness in the real economy and engaging in huge financial invest-
ments (Najib, 2010a, 2010d; NEAC, 2010a, 2010b). At the inaugural of the National 
Economic Advisory Council (NEAC), which drafted the NEM, Najib (2009d) pro-
nounced the continuation of economic reforms en route to neoliberal convergence by 
“realigning … economic strategy to accommodate today’s competitive environment”; 
by accelerating liberalization efforts; and by continuing post-1997 crisis plans of action 
that “fostered the transformation of Malaysia into a free market economy”. He then 
instructed NEAC “to review the importance of traditional relationships and respon-
sibilities in the economic sphere”, so as to “create a new relationship of public/private 
partnership”, where the government “manages the economy and ensure[s] an economic 
environment that is conducive to long term, stable growth”, and where the private sec-
tor “provides a strong engine for growth, as it is able to react almost immediately to 
changes in market conditions, much faster than any government” (Najib, 2009d).
The 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) was established in 2009 to carry out 
ETP’s strategizing activities and meet funding requirements. It turned into a sover-
eign wealth fund with diversified interests in key economic areas identified under the 
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ETP such as oil and energy, financial and business services, and communications and 
infrastructure. The Government of Malaysia was 1MDB’s only shareholder, ensuring 
“a unified public-private sector approach and policy alignment towards a competitive 
Malaysia” (1MDB, n.d.). The Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) Institute characterized 
1MDB as an enterprise “funded by debt guaranteed by the Malaysian federal govern-
ment” (SWF Institute, 2012). 
Early on, critics were wary of Najib’s intention in creating 1MDB on suspicion that 
its funds could be used as electoral capital for BN’s money politics and as a business 
machine to enrich or bail out UMNO cronies (Zahiid, 2011). Soon after, corruption 
allegations and financial scandals surrounding the mismanagement of the 1MDB 
immensely contributed to the dismal electoral showing and eventual defeat of Najib 
and BN during the 2013 and 2018 general elections. The Najib government tried to 
contain local media news on the 1MDB controversy through censorship of critical 
online media outlets, like The Malaysian Insider news site. Nonetheless, international 
news agencies, particularly The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, have fol-
lowed the controversy and regularly published reports on the 1MDB scandal since July 
2015, including the exposé that some USD 1 billion from the state investment fund 
had been deposited to Najib’s personal bank account (Hope, Paige, Welch, Murray, 
& Canipe, 2016). The 1MDB scandal elicited a motley crew of discontents with Najib 
even within the UMNO, not least the sustained criticism from Mahathir who unequiv-
ocally demanded Najib’s removal and finally resigned from the party in February 2016 
(Murad, 2016). On his part, in 2015, Najib sacked cabinet officials over the 1MDB con-
troversies, notably his deputy minister Muhyiddin Yassin and Attorney-General Abdul 
Gani Patail (Teoh, 2015). Muhyiddin was openly critical of the government’s handling 
of the 1MDB case, and Abdul Gani led a high-level investigation of the alleged money 
trail of the 1MDB funds ending up in Najib’s bank accounts. In 2016, the Najib gov-
ernment classified the Auditor-General’s report on the financial transactions and 
accounting of assets of the 1MDB under the Officials Secrets Act. But within a week 
after Najib had lost the 2018 general elections, the new government under Mahathir 
made this report public. The Auditor-General’s report basically confirms previous 
news and longstanding criticisms on 1MDB’s poor corporate governance and illicit 
transactions – including the claim that, between 2009 and 2014, the company had accu-
mulated debt and inherited loans totaling MYR 42 billion (USD 10.6 billion) (The Edge 
Singapore, 2018). The U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ), together with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service, also launched an investiga-
tion into alleged fund misappropriations of the 1MDB. In June 2017, the USDOJ filed 
“civil forfeiture complaints” under its Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, seeking to 
recover nearly USD 1.7 billion worth of assets that might have been laundered through 
financial institutions in the United States (Hui, 2018; Paddock, 2017; USDOJ, 2017).
The 10MP provided the details of growth targets, budgetary allocations, and 
implementation of 1Malaysia, GTP, and ETP-NEM for 2011-2015 (Malaysia, 2010). It 
maintained the development objectives of previous administrations, with emphasis 
on continuous financial and institutional support for the Bumiputera Commercial 
and Industrial Community and affirmative actions for Bumiputeras in equity owner-
ship restructuring efforts (Najib, 2010a). Yet, it was especially intended to deal with 
the impacts of the global economic crisis on the domestic economy. Najib (2009d) had 
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outlined state-market relations in Malaysia’s neoliberalism during crisis moments: 
“When the dynamic private sector retreats, the government must step in and increase 
its investments to fill the void.” This, as Najib (2009d) pointed out, had been the case 
since the 1997 Asian crisis which made it difficult to realize private sector-led growth 
and market-led development as envisaged in Vision 2020. The NEM and the 10MP 
defined the “strategies for a more focused role for the government as an enabler, reg-
ulator and catalyst” and emphasized the “shift [of] the onus now for the private sector 
to step up its role as the true engine of growth” (Najib, 2010c). To stimulate participa-
tion of the private sector, which “has not been playing its part” since the 1997 crisis 
(Najib, 2009d), the government had planned to venture into massive investments in 
megaprojects and allotted a Facilitation Fund of MYR 20 billion (USD 5 billion) for 
public-private partnerships (Najib, 2010a, 2010d). 
1Malaysia was also the development program for the last leg of the journey 
to Vision 2020 as laid out in the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (11MP) for 2016-2020. The 
Malaysian National Development Strategy (MyNDS) is the guiding action plan for the 
11MP. MyNDS enjoins market-based solutions to attain the goals of social inclusion 
and environmental sustainability through increasing high impact labor productiv-
ity and technological innovation at low cost for the government. Thus, what the 
11MP’s theme of “anchoring growth on people” means is that its real centerpiece is the 
advancement of the “capital economy” (GDP growth, big businesses, mega investment 
projects, and financial markets) under which the “people economy” (workers, small-
and-medium enterprises, families, and communities) is subsumed (Malaysia, 2015b). 
Neoliberal Crisis Responses 
As a crisis response, 1Malaysia undertook several key institutional measures, of which 
six of them were notable. These economic policies and strategies were aimed at 
weathering the impact of the 2008 global economic crisis and the effects of the sharp 
drop in oil prices in the world market that followed. Their goal was to restore growth 
in the export-oriented industries. 
The first of these measures was the expression of the Najib regime’s interests in 
the stability of the global capitalist system. As he was about to assume the premier-
ship, Najib (2008) called for the reform of the global financial architecture and urged 
governments to draw on the lessons of the Malaysian ‘successful’ experience of capital 
and exchange controls in dealing with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. He appealed to 
the G8 countries to “come to grips with the seriousness of the global financial turmoil, 
so that the capitalistic system as we know it do not break down or collapse amidst 
rising bank failures, bankruptcies and market meltdown” (Najib, 2008). Then, at the 
2009 World Capital Markets Symposium, he proposed for a “regulatory laissez faire” in 
the financial system where “regulatory oversight should take precedence over the pur-
suit of private profit through the manipulation of unfettered capital” (Najib, 2009e).
The second measure was for the restoration of political order, immediately fol-
lowing the 2008 general elections. Najib (2008) claimed that “predictability, stability 
and certainty in [Malaysia’s] system of governance” have been the linchpin of the 
country’s capitalist development, as these conditions are needed for market secu-
rity and profitability. This particular crisis response signified a couple of important 
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features in the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism under Najib: (1) Democracy is 
limited to the electoral exercise; and (2) the objective of securing market order entails 
an anti-politics attitude towards the opposition where “[there] is no time for politick-
ing or to score points politically” (Najib, 2008).
The third of these measures were the two Economic Stimulus Packages (ESPs) 
roughly amounting to MYR 67 billion (USD 16.5 billion), or 9% of GDP, to inject 
spending into the domestic economy with the hope of recovery of the private sec-
tor and the economy as a whole during the 2009-2011 period (Goh & Lim, 2009; 
Mahani & Rasiah, 2009; Najib, 2009f). ESP 1 was allotted for infrastructure, trans-
portation, education, banking, and finance. ESP 2 took the forms of bank guarantees, 
tax incentives, and allocations to the National Sovereign Fund. These packages were 
appropriated mostly for private sector assistance and infrastructure, and the rest for 
social protection programs and subsidies for food, toll, fuel, and low-cost housing. 
The fourth measure had to do with further liberalization. At the 13th Malaysian 
Banking Summit, Najib (2009g) commented that “to make 1Malaysia a reality … the 
Government needs to partner actively with the business community”. Accordingly, 
Najib (2009g), as concurrent Finance Minister, announced the liberalization of the 
financial sector “as a key enabler and catalyst of economic growth”. This was earlier 
complemented by the liberalization of the services sub-sectors and related efforts to 
“continue to modify or eliminate policies that inhibit growth” (Najib, 2009f). Other 
reforms that Najib (2009e, 2009f) announced include: removing 30% bumiputera 
equity requirements for listed companies; liberalizing the capital market growth 
agenda by attracting international firms in broking and Islamic finance; deregulating 
the Foreign Investment Committee guidelines; and restructuring government-linked 
companies to be globally competitive. These liberalization schemes were connected 
to the ambition for Kuala Lumpur to become a “global financial center” through a 
megaproject of the 1MDB in partnership with Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development 
Company to construct the Kuala Lumpur International Financial District – a 34-hectare 
real-estate development amounting to around MYR 26 billion (USD 6.5 billion) (Najib, 
2010e). Renamed as the Tun Razak Exchange (TRX) after Najib’s father, the construc-
tion of this megaproject only began in 2013 and the plan expanded to 70 hectares. But 
the Najib government was soon compelled to de-link the TRX from the 1MDB state 
fund and the money laundering controversies surrounding it. 
All these liberalization agendas, however, cannot be construed as the Malaysian 
state’s unqualified embrace of orthodox neoliberalism. As Najib (2009b) categorically 
declared:
We welcome others into Malaysia, while maintaining our own special identity 
and protecting our economic interests … [W]e are not liberalising to conform 
to some new economic orthodoxy … Our objective is clear: to ensure that 
Malaysians – our people and our companies … benefit from the competitive 
dynamics that are shaping the global marketplace.
The fifth measure was fiscal discipline, mostly imposed during Najib’s second term 
(2013-2018), through austerity programs that cut subsidies and funds for welfare, 
health, and education. The government implemented a series of major tax and fiscal 
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reforms to replace long-running populist economic policies to address the challenges 
of budget deficit, the fall in global oil prices, and the depreciation of the Ringgit. 
Firstly, the Najib administration removed blanket subsidy for fuel in 2014 and then 
proposed to cut electricity subsidy in 2017. Energy subsidies, especially on electricity 
and transport fuel, have existed since the 1980s to protect low-income households 
and stimulate economic activity. The rolling back of this state-subsidized fuel con-
sumption is in line with the neoliberal principle of getting prices ‘right’ by letting the 
market set the ‘real’ costs of energy usage.
Secondly, the government implemented the GST (goods and services tax) at the 
standard rate of 6% in April 2015. The GST was intended to increase revenue to off-
set decades-long fiscal deficits. From 1988 to 2017, the government budget deficit 
of Malaysia averaged 2.97% of GDP (Trading Economics, 2018). During the 2009 
global recession, the deficit further ballooned to its highest level equal to 6.7% of 
GDP due to stimulus packages and subsidies for the domestic economy. It was also 
hoped that the income generated from GST would reduce government’s dependence 
on oil and natural gas revenues, especially from the state-owned Petronas. The GST 
was a broad-based tax on most consumptions and imports made in Malaysia. But 
the exports of goods and services from Malaysia were generally GST-free; thus giv-
ing incentives to an export-oriented production system to encourage GDP growth. 
The GST was implemented when the Ringgit was depreciating, when currencies of 
commodity exporting countries like Malaysia were negatively affected by oil price 
fluctuations since 2014. The combined effects of GST and the weakening Ringgit 
on rising prices and living costs have been mostly felt by poor households, ordinary 
workers, and the middle class (cf. Ng, 2015). 
China Policy 
The sixth crisis response measure was the strategy to look to or emulate China’s eco-
nomic strategy and integrate Chinese capital into Malaysia’s accumulation regime. 
This was in line with the overall plan to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and portfolio investments from emerging economies that form part of the BRICS 
(especially China, India, and Brazil) while continuously engaging with traditional 
partners US, EU, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN. Najib (2009b) can-
didly justified that his first official visit to a non-ASEAN country was made to China 
upon the invitation of the former Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao because Malaysia’s 
relationship with China is “fundamental to our national interests” and “there are 
many mutual lessons to be learnt and shared between our countries”.
Firstly, Najib (2009b) had expressed Malaysia’s interest in getting a market share of 
Chinese capital in recognition of the fact that “China has enormous foreign exchange 
reserves which amount to larger than the combined reserves of all the G7 countries 
added together”. At the Business Forum organized by the Government of Malaysia 
in Beijing, Najib (2009h) regarded China as a “strategic partner”, and thus laid down 
his economic agenda for expansion with his state counterpart and China’s business 
community (see also FMPRC, 2011; Najib, 2010f).
Secondly, Najib (2009b) highlighted one of the important lessons from the 
Chinese development experience: “the realization that for China, like Malaysia, an 
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open door economic policy has brought extraordinary economic progress”. At the 
2010 World Chinese Economic Forum in Kuala Lumpur, held exactly a year after 
the former Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Malaysia, Najib (2010f) announced 
that “Malaysia has become China’s largest trading partner among ASEAN countries”. 
Najib (2010f) then went on to declare: “The lessons that can be learned from China, 
and from the rise of Asia as a whole, is that Free Trade, open markets, and openness to 
investment are the way to prosperity”. Since 2009, China has been Malaysia’s largest 
trading partner. Between 2009 and 2017, Chinese exports to Malaysia amounted to 
USD 41.7 billion (i.e., 10.8% year-over-year increase), and Malaysian exports to China 
amounted to USD 54.3 billion (i.e., 10.2% year-over-year increase) (Liu, 2018). 
In terms of investments, Chinese FDI in Malaysia were relatively small until 
2012. But both Chinese FDI in, and trade volume with, Malaysia skyrocketed during 
Najib’s second term starting in 2013, at the time when Chinese President Xi Jinping 
assumed power and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched. Within 
the BRI framework, Chinese FDI into Malaysia during 2013-2017 grew nearly 350%, 
totaling USD 2.36 billion – which is a 20.2% contribution to FDI growth (Liu, 2018). 
Big investments from China got increasing public attention since the late 2015 
when the 1MDB sold its entire assets in the power sector under the Edra Global 
Energy Berhad to China General Nuclear Power Corporation for MYR 9.83 billion 
(USD 2.3 billion) cash (Chin, 2015). Then, in 2016, Najib made another official visit to 
China to formalize dozens of agreements between Malaysian and Chinese compa-
nies worth around MYR 144 billion (USD 36.1 billion), covering diverse sectors such 
as infrastructure, manufacturing, and real estate (“M’sian, Chinese firms sign”, 2016). 
Eleven high-profile deals between China and Malaysia totaling USD 134 billion had 
been reported, including the controversial East Coast Rail Link (Liu, 2018). The 
Malaysian government guaranteed the loans to finance the high-risk megaprojects. 
With these agreements, the Najib regime had tied Malaysian society and economy 
to the Chinese government and business interests for decades ahead. These deals 
generated political opposition, and became a critical issue against the Najib admin-
istration during the 2018 elections. The increasing presence of Chinese workers and 
enterprises in Malaysia is also creating social tension among the local population 
(Tham, 2018). 
Indeed, Malaysia under Najib had economic interests in China’s capital reservoir. 
But it may also be the case that the Najib government looked to China as an exemplar 
of an authoritarian-neoliberal regime with a strong state that is capable of managing 
a capitalist production system and its social consequences. 
In his bid for re-election in 2018, Najib campaigned for continuity of 1Malaysia’s 
purported accomplishments and its transformation program towards a high-income 
and equal country. But Najib and the UMNO/BN suffered a stunning defeat from 
the Mahathir-led coalition Pakatan Harapan, which campaigned on the message of 
change and criticized the actual political, societal, and economic achievements of the 
1Malaysia vision – particularly the authoritarianism, neoliberalism, and corruption 
of the Najib regime. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The GE14 put an end to 61 years of UMNO/BN dominance. It also culminated the 
two decades of the Reformasi movement’s electoral opposition. Among other things, 
the outcome of the historic election signifies a loud ‘protest vote’ against the more 
advanced version of the regime of authoritarian neoliberalism under Najib and the 
large-scale corruption that came with it. 
The new ruling government under Mahathir promises an ambitious agenda for 
‘regime change’, encompassing the spheres of governance, ethnic relations, and econ-
omy. This article has attempted to reveal the operating principles and institutions 
of the enduring regime of authoritarian neoliberalism in Malaysia – which must be 
the targets of reform initiatives, and against which the extent of the promised social 
change shall be evaluated. 
Authoritarian neoliberalism has been the de facto social regime in Malaysia 
where the neoliberal economy was being made to operate within a strong state. It 
evolved through the administrations of Mahathir, Abdullah, and Najib. The political-
business interests of the ruling elites largely shaped the priorities and tendencies of 
this regime. Since the official termination of the NEP in 1991, the discursive muta-
tions in Malaysia’s development agendas have conformed to the discernible shift in 
specific phases of the global political economy of capitalism. However, as this article 
has shown, the Malaysian state’s policy choices cannot be reduced to some overarch-
ing ideology of orthodox neoliberalism, or process of neoliberalization, according 
to the templates of the Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus. 
Formal compliance to the evolving global discourse on capitalist development might 
have been based on the calculations of the state elites on the benefits of adopting 
neoliberalism in their domestic laws, external agreements, and policy pronounce-
ments – thereby, avoiding the cost of being excluded from the expanded market share 
and accumulation opportunities under conditions of globalization (Tabb, 2004). 
Arguably, Malaysia’s governing elites and their cronies were motivated by their self-
interests, rather than pure ideology, in yielding to neoliberal discourses and policies.
Mahathir’s 22-year premiership hammered out and nurtured the foundations of 
authoritarian neoliberalism. His administration laid out the Wawasan 2020 devel-
opment framework upon which the subsequent programs of Islam Hadhari and 
1Malaysia were built. Wawasan 2020 was: constructed by a hegemonic network that 
cut across classes and ethnicities; operated by a political-business alliance within 
the UMNO power bloc; characterized by a calibrated neoliberalism with a national 
industrialization strategy; and orchestrated by an authoritarian state. It tried to 
ensure political stability through state’s anti-democratic, coercive means. In addition, 
it sought to manage the economic accumulation process through active state inter-
vention in favor of its cronies and of what it perceived to be ‘the national interest’.
Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari envisioned a state-managed capitalist development with 
ethnic Malay and religious Islam undertones. It was presented as a socio-political and 
economic program for a moderate Islam in the aftermaths of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and the 9/11 global war on terror. It initially succeeded as an electoral campaign 
to win over a larger Malay constituency but later failed to sustain the confidence of 
both the electorate and the UMNO network. Abdullah failed to deliver on his reform 
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promises. His anti-corruption initiatives were thwarted by entrenched vested inter-
ests including from his own family. 
The 1Malaysia agenda of Najib built on the neoliberalization process started off by 
Mahathir with a view to more open real economy and financial sector towards global 
competitiveness. Amid the stagnating effect of the 2008-2009 global economic reces-
sion on Malaysia’s export industry, the competitiveness project to venture out into 
high value-added production system was coupled with investments in megaprojects 
and an ambitious scheme to make Kuala Lumpur a global financial center. Central to 
this drive for competitiveness were Najib government’s conscious efforts in emulating 
as well as making lucrative business deals and high-risk investments with the rising 
China. During its second term, the Najib administration also resorted to govern-
ment austerity and other fiscal disciplinary measures to supposedly address budget 
deficits, fall in oil prices, and the depreciation of the Ringgit. Embroiled in massive 
corruption scandals and crime allegations, Najib’s rhetoric involved a doublespeak, 
especially about democratization, but his anti-democratic actions spoke for them-
selves. The Najib regime saw authoritarianism as the most viable political system on 
which intensified capital accumulation and the maintenance of UMNO/BN hege-
mony were to be embedded.
The reform programs of Mahathir’s new government will be closely scrutinized by 
the now opposition UMNO/BN and the vibrant new media. Most crucially, Mahathir 
will be held accountable by his current political supporters from Pakatan Harapan, 
originally belonging to the Reformasi movement, who once faulted him for much of 
what ails contemporary Malaysia in terms of a culture of impunity, corruption, and 
other institutional malaises. This article’s exposition of the enduring institutions of 
authoritarian neoliberalism in Malaysia points to where and why reforms for genuine 
democracy, social justice, economic development, and wealth redistribution must be 
made.
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